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COMMENTS
CURRENT AND FUTURE LEGAL USES OF DIRECT
BROADCAST SATELLITES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Introduction
When the 1979 session of the Legal Sub-Committee of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ended, thirteen
"Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites
for [International] Direct Television Broadcast" had been accepted,' but
consensus on the free flow of information and the rights of States to
send and receive information was not achieved. 2 As a result, the po-
larization of positions regarding the right of a state to prevent direct
television broadcasts into its territory unless it grants prior consent
continues, with the extreme positions occupied by the United States and
the Soviet Union.
The issue of the right of a State to broadcast television signals
directly into another without the consent of the target State is a major
international problem of continuing importance. Further, the inexorable
advance of satellite broadcasting technology will continue to increase
the likelihood of political and cultural disruption as direct broadcast
satellite systems become a world-wide possibility in the next few years.
While several treaties exist which may be construed to prevent direct
broadcasting into a neighboring State from an orbiting satellite, these
treaties are not universally accepted and it is unclear whether they
represent customary international law. Thus, it is necessary to determine
the rules of customary international law with regard to direct broadcasts
from satellites in the event States withdraw from existing treaties or these
non-universal treaties are found not to be customary international law.
If these treaties are not customary international law, then States which
are not parties to the treaties may serve as bases from which other States
could vicariously circumvent the treaties to which they are bound without
actually breaching those treaties or violating customary international law.
Although most of the space powers are parties to several treaties,
the possibility arises that unless customary international law prevents
direct television broadcasts, a State which is not party to any space
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I. C. Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space 707 (1982).
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treaty could find a lucrative source of income by serving as the official
base from which parties who are treaty signatories could circumvent
those treaties by selling a satellite to State X and letting that State
proceed to make its legal, and possibly extremely disruptive, broadcasts
into the target country.3 However, if customary international law pro-
hibits such activity, then current space treaties need not be considered
the sole source of law (nor could parties commence broadcasting twelve
months after announcing intent to withdraw from the treaties), and no
new treaties or amendments to existing treaties are necessary to prevent
direct television broadcasts.
To determine the current legal state of and likely future legal state
of direct television broadcasts from space, this Comment will examine
the effects of existing international agreements on direct broadcasting
satellites (DBS), the validity of the current legal positions of States
regarding DBS, the possibility of the development of a multinational
treaty on DBS, and whether a multinational treaty is needed.
The Problem of Direct Television Broadcasts
"Direct satellite broadcasting refers to the transmission of messages
from the satellite directly to community receivers or to individual home
television sets without the need of local stations to receive and rebroad-
cast."' The possibility of direct home reception is of major international
concern since community reception is subject to government control.'
It is essential to establish the seriousness with which the international
community regards the possibility of direct home reception of foreign
broadcasts. Since "[djirect satellite broadcasting makes possible the same
capability for television broadcasting by satellite that has existed until
now [only] for powerful shortwave radio transmitters," '6 the stronger
psychological impact of television has increased the concerns of many
States. In fact, the high illiteracy rate and lack of other modern forms
of entertainment will certainly result in an even greater impact in under-
developed States where "[slevere psychological addiction is a likeli-
hood."' Indeed, until recently in Brazil from noon until late at night televi-
sion viewing rates have been seventy-five percent higher than in the U.S.'
3. In a sense, this would be analogous to current shipping practice in which some
States allow oil companies to register their tankers under that State's flag for a small
fee, thereby permitting the oil companies to avoid the stricter safety and liability laws of
other States.
4. K. Queeney, Direct Broadcast Satellites and the United Nations 7 (1978).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 89-125.
6. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 7.
7. Comment, Direct Broadcast Satellites: Implications for Less-Developed Countries
and for World Order, 12 Va. J. Int'l L. 66, 75 (1971).
8. Id.
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Obviously, the major concern of any country is loss of control over pro-
gram content available to its population.
Because DBS have been operating in various forms since the United
States launched the Applications Technology Satellite in 1974,9 and
because over 100 countries now participate in INTELSAT ° which uses
DBS, it appears certain that State practice has sanctioned the use of
DBS. The troublesome question concerns how those DBS are used.
Current International Treaties on Outer Space Activities
Of the five U.N. space treaties, only the Outer Space Treaty (OST)"
appears applicable to DBS. The Moon Treaty 12 deals exclusively with
activities on celestial bodies and is clearly inapplicable. Similarly, the
Rescue and Return Treaty 3 is inapplicable. While the Treaty on the
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space' 4 determines in which
country a DBS is considered registered, it has little relevance in terms
of the legality of unrestricted direct broadcasts from satellites. Article
II of the Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects 5 indicates that the liability of a launching State is
limited to the damage caused by the object itself, not by emanations
from it.16 The article states "[a] launching State [is liable] . . . for
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to
aircraft in flight."' 7 It is significant that the treaty does not use the
language "damage caused by activities of its space object." It seems
clear that the occurrence contemplated by the treaty is collision, rather
9. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 1.
10. Canby, Satellites That Serve Us, 164 Nat'l Geographic 281, 290 (1983). INTELSAT
is a private international organization which uses DBS for various communications and
educational purposes.
11. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.|.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Oct. 10, 1967), reprinted
in C. Christol, supra note 1, at 851 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
12. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/Res./34/68 (1979), reprinted in C. Christol, supra
note 1, at 880.
13. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, April 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No.
6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, reprinted id. at 858.
14. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975,
28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, reprinted id. at 874.
15. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, reprinted id. at 863 [hereinafter cited as
Liability Treaty].
16. Obviously, this restriction does not include "emanations" (such as nuclear ra-
diation) more appropriately considered in light of the OST's prohibition against weapons
of mass destruction.
17. Liability Treaty, Article 11, supra note 15.
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than operation,' 8 and therefore, the Liability Treaty is inapplicable to the
question of DBS.
Therefore, the only applicable U.N. treaty is the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty (OST), currently ratified by eighty-four States.' 9 Despite the fact
that the issue of foreign propaganda broadcasts from satellites had been
raised at the U.N. as early as 1962 and 1963,20 and that in 1966 at the
beginning of discussion on the OST widespread anxiety persisted over
possible direct broadcast of television signals without the prior consent
of the receiving State,2' no explicit mention of direct broadcast satellites
appears in the OST. While it is true that the OST is quite general in
its treatment of legal principles applicable to outer space, the lack of
specific mention of DBS indicates that the States parties to the treaty
could not come to a basic agreement on DBS. However, the preamble
to the treaty does refer to UN General Assembly Resolution 110(II)
"which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or en-
courage .any threat to the peace. ' ' 22 Though the preamble is not con-
sidered a binding element of a treaty, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties states that the preamble of a treaty is to be
considered in any attempt to divine the intent of the signatories as
expressed in the body of the treaty. 23
Article I of the OST states that the use of outer space must be
carried out "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. ' 24 In
light of the general nature of this language, the use of DBS must be
considered, in a general sense, to be beneficial to all countries. 25 Clearly
then, according to Article I the problem of DBS is not in their existence
or operation, but the specific uses of DBS by States party to the treaty.
Article II of the treaty states that outer space is not susceptible of
national appropriation. 26 In terms of DBS, the portion of outer space
which may be argued to be "appropriated" is the geosynchronous orbit. 27
18. Diederiks-Verschoor, Observations on Remote Sensing, in Legal Implications of
Remoting Sensing from Outer Space 74 (N. Matte ed. 1976).
19. C. Christol, supra note 1, at 912.
20. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), reprinted in 1963 U.N.Y.B. 101. See also K.
Queeney, supra note 4, at 13.
21. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 13.
22. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.
23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 (adopted May 22, 1969),
reprinted in G. Knight, International Law and State Practice: Cases and Documents 9-
82 (1981).
24. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. I.
25. Gorove, Implications of International Space Law for Private Enterprise, 7 Annals
of Air & Space L. 319, 321 (1982).
26. Outer Space Treaty, art. 11, supra note 11.
27. The geosynchronous orbit is an orbit 22,300 miles out from the equator which
allows a satellite, such as a DBS, to remain in the same position relative to a point on
[Vol.45
COMMENTS
However, neither scholars nor the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space have regarded Article II as a ban on the
use of natural resources. 21 In fact, the policy of "first come, first served"
regarding outer space had been followed since the beginning of space
exploration, and the OST did not appear to alter this practice. 29 Yet,
while the legitimacy of placing DBS in geosynchronous orbit has been
established, the limits of use of those satellites under the OST have
not.
As mentioned earlier,30 proper interpretation of the OST would
prevent the broadcast of propaganda designed or likely to disrupt the
peace. U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 110 (II) of 3 No-
vember 1947, to which the OST preamble refers, sought to prevent
threats to the peace of the international community. An analysis of this
section of the OST also requires a determination of what constitutes
propaganda. Since the information delivered by a DBS would often have
the effect of disrupting the domestic order of receiving States, accurate
classification of such information as propaganda or not is essential.
Given the difficulty of defining "propaganda" and the indication that
UNGA Resolution 110 (II) refers to threats to peace in the international
community, it does not appear likely that the preamble to the OST
effectively condemns the use of DBS for broadcasting into another State.
Further, the specific provisions of the treaty do not lend themselves to
an interpretation that would prohibit direct broadcasting of television
signals into another country.
Article I of the OST proclaims that outer space shall be free for
use by all States without discrimination of any kind,3" but the context
of this paragraph indicates that equality of access is its subject.
Article III may contain a prohibition against direct satellite broad-
casts which have an adverse impact on States, since that article requires
States to carry out activities in outer space "in accordance with inter-
national law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest
of maintaining international peace and security and promoting inter-
national co-operation and understanding. '3 2 However, since it can be
argued that even politically oriented broadcasts promote understanding,
Article III does not appear to pose much of an obstacle to the use of
DBS.
the Earth's surface throughout its orbit, eliminating the need for using a number of
satellites for DBS.
28. Gorove, supra note 25, at 323.
29. Id. at 325.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
31. Outer Space Treaty, art. I, supra note 11.
32. Outer Space Treaty, art. III, supra note 11.
19851
LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW
In any event, the sweeping language and broad scope of Articles I
and III have been seen as merely stating generalities" of such breadth
that until specific operative principles are established, any peaceful use
of outer space is acceptable. This conclusion, of course, prompts the
question of what constitutes "peaceful" use. As mentioned earlier,3 4
peace between nations in the sense of international conflict appears to
be the only realistic interpretation of this concept. Thus, it appears that
while the Outer Space Treaty does prohibit use of DBS designed to or
likely to result in a breach of international peace, the treaty is not
specific enough to be applicable in situations where direct broadcasts
are designed or likely to cause domestic unrest in the receiving country.
Even if the treaty were interpreted as prohibiting broadcasts of this
nature, the lack of specificity of the treaty on this matter prevents
reading the treaty as a complete ban on direct broadcasts, and, as a
result, determining whether a broadcast violates the treaty would be an
enormously difficult, if not impossible, task.
Since the Outer Space Treaty is not self-executing,35 does not provide
sufficient guidance in determining the legality of direct television broad-
casts into another State without its prior consent, and can be withdrawn
from upon twelve months' notice,3 6 other sources must be consulted to
determine the international legal status of direct television broadcasts
without prior consent of the target State.
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
The ITU is the "principle international institution for achieving
agreement among nations on the use of telecommunications.1 3 7 The 1973
ITU Convention has been ratified by every country on Earth and binds
them with treaty force.38 In addition to the general principles laid out
in the Convention, communications satellites are regulated by the ITU
Radio Regulations.39 Though these regulations are not applicable to the
purely domestic telecommunications of a member State, 40 they are ap-
plicable when domestic services interfere with those of neighboring States
33. Brooks, Technological and Legal Aspects of Environmental Monitoring, I J.
Space L. 6, 35 (1973).
34. See supra text accompanying note 30.
35. See, e.g., Dula, Regulation of Private Commercial Space Activities, in Proceedings
of the Twenty-Fourth Colloquium on the Law of the Outer Space 25, 28 (1982), and
preceding discussion.
36. Outer Space Treaty, art. XVI, supra note 11.
37. Rice, Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites: International Constraints and
Domestic Options, 25 N. Y. L. Sch. Rev. 813, 814 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rice).
38. C. Christol, supra note 1, at 612; see also id. at 814.
39. Rice, supra note 17, at 814.
40. Id. at 815.
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unless a separate agreement has been reached by those States. 41
Generally, the ITU provides for the technical coordination of com-
munications systems, the allocation of frequencies, allocations of orbital
positions, what portion of the radio spectrum States use to broadcast
programs, and the integration of future direct broadcast systems.4 2 Though
the previous method of regulation was protection of existing frequency
assignments upon proper notification and registration of a station, the
recent trend has been toward planned spectrum use for DBS.43
Changes in and additions to ITU regulations are made at World
Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCs)." At the 1977 WARC for
Broadcast Satellites (WARC-BS), plans for ITU Regions 1 and 3 (es-
sentially the entire world but the Americas) 45 were proposed and even-
tually adopted which had a significant impact on DBS. These plans were
"designed to permit individual reception, using antennae under one meter
in diameter, such as could readily be installed in individual homes."
While some sources feel that the plan's technical limitations on broadcast
frequencies eliminate the fear of undesired direct broadcasting into for-
eign States, 47 those same sources admit that the new regulations merely
make such broadcasting far more difficult. 48 This admission and the
fact that the Soviet Union and Third World countries continue to push
for a binding multi-lateral agreement prohibiting direct broadcasting
without prior consent of the receiving country4 9 strongly indicate that
the fear that technological advances would allow direct broadcasting is
neither illusory nor remedied by WARC 1977. Of course, the main
reasons for desiring a specific treaty on DBS is that ITU. regulations
are more easily changed and their abrogation is less politically damaging
than withdrawal from a treaty.
Hence, a determination of the status of DBS under customary in-
ternational law is important since neither the regulations of the ITU
41. Id.
42. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 18.
43. Rice, supra note 37, at 815-16.
44. Id. at 814.
45. Region I consists of Africa, Europe, the Middle East, all of the U.S.S.R., Turkey,
and Mongolia; Region 2 consists of Greenland, North and South America, the Caribbean,
and Hawaii; Region 3 consists of Asia (except for those areas in Region 1), Australia,
and most of the Pacific islands. See Pal, Space, Man, and Interaction in Centre for
Research of Air & Space Law, Earth-Oriented Space Activities and Their Legal Implications
2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Space Activities].
46. Rice, supra note 37 at 818.
47. K. Queeney, supra note 4 at 212.
48. "Mr. Butler, representative of the ITU, stated that . 'the reception of programs
from neighboring countries at the present state of art will be far less easy in the case
of the broadcasting satellites services than in the case of terrestrial broadcasting."' Id.
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 89-97.
1985]
LOUISIANA LA WREVIEW
nor the OST satisfactorily cover the issue. In fact, despite the existence
of the ITU and the several U.N. treaties concerning outer space, it appears
there is no widely accepted, codified space law applicable to all coun-
triesA0
One of the major reasons certain States desire a binding prohibition
of direct broadcasts without prior consent of the target State is the
problem created by broadcast "spillover." Since a DBS placed in geo-
synchronous orbit would illuminate an area of one million square miles5'
(approximately the area of India, and slightly less than one-third the
area of the continental United States52), the problem of a signal meant
for domestic consumption spilling over into a neighboring country is
great. Naturally, the existence and severity of spillover depends on the
size, shape, and location of the State, as well as the diameter of the
satellite beam, degree of signal strength fall-off, and maintenance of
the satellite's position. 3 The ITU attempted to diminish this problem
with WARC Provision Number 428A which declared that "all technical
means available shall be used to reduce, to the maximum extent prac-
ticable the radiation over the territory of other countries unless an
agreement has been reached with such other countries." '5 4 The degree
of compliance with this provision would be determined by officials of
the International Frequency Registration Board. 5 This provision would
prevent "international spillover," and has formed the basis of some
States' claim that the provision established the concept of "prior con-
sent" in international law.5 6 Other States argued that the provision merely
set technical goals for DBS operation and was devoid of legal impli-
cation." Given the language that the broadcasting State must reduce
spillover "to the maximum extent practicable" 58 this writer believes that
the ITU Provision simply indicates a general technical guideline and
does not absolutely prohibit spillover. Rather than read into the provision
a broad principle of international law which has yet to be settled by
the United Nations," a more restrained interpretation of the ITU Provision
seems appropriate.
50. Dula, supra note 35, at 38.
51. C. Christol, supra note 1, at 606.
52. The Hammond Whole Earth Atlas 4 (new census ed. 1984).
53. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 88.
54. Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference-1971, Prov. No. 428A,
reprinted in id. at 89 [hereinafter cited as WARC 428A].
55. Id.
56. Id. at 152.
57. Id. at 171.
58. WARC 428A, reprinted in id. at 89.
59. Ploman, Satellite Broadcasting, National Sovereignty, and Free Flow of Infor-
mation, in National Sovereignty and International Communication 160 (K. Nordenstreng
ed. 1979).
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Have the UN Treaties and the ITU Resulted in the Creation of a
Rule of Customary International Law?
Excluding the Moon Treaty (which has been ratified by only three
countries and bears little chance of entering into force), 60 as of 1982
only twenty-two countries were bound by all four of the remaining U.N.
treaties and the ITU convention. 61 When a short span of time is involved,
the formation of a rule of customary international law requires extensive
and virtually uniform State practice. 62 In the case of the OST, eighty-
four States out of 154 have ratified the treaty-quite possibly an in-
sufficient number to be considered extensive State practice in a matter
of world-wide concern. If one accepts that the legal treatment of outer
space is of significant concern to every State on Earth, it must be
conceded that the OST constitutes neither a codification of customary
international law for DBS nor has it developed into customary inter-
national law after it entered into force in 1967. As far as the ITU
Convention is concerned, while every State is a party to it and its
provisions have the force of a treaty, since the Convention itself is
primarily a regulatory agency, it is probable that neither the ITU nor
its regulations are considered as embodying customary international law
by those states party to it.63 As a result, the ITU Convention does not
even have the concept of opinio juris64 operating in favor of the creation
of customary international law. Thus, while customary international law
can develop from a treaty6 it does not appear to have developed from
any of the treaties concerning activities in outer space.
The Positions of States on Direct Broadcast Satellites
Although the existing treaties do not establish universally accepted
legal rules for activity in outer space, this is not to say that no customary
international law exists regarding those activities. In fact, space is and
has been subject to customary international rules of law. 66 However, to
decide what, if any, of those rules apply to DBS, an examination of
the positions of States on certain matters closely related to direct tele-
vision broadcast without prior consent is necessary.
60. C. Christol, supra note 1, at 912.
61. Id. at 913.
62. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Rep. of Ger. v. Denmark; Federal
Rep. of Ger. v. Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 [hereinafter cited as North Sea Cases].
63. See, for example, the discussion of the dispute over whether WARC Provision
428A embodies customary international law, supra text accompanying -notes 54-59.
64. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 44.
65. Id. at 41.
66. See generally, McDougal, The Emerging Customary Law of Space, 58 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 618 (1963).
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The Geosynchronous Orbit
An essential element of DBS is the placement of the satellite in
geosynchronous orbit. The geosynchronous orbit is located 22,300 miles
from the Earth's surface, on the equatorial plane. Satellites placed in
this orbital position remain in the same place in space in relation to
the Earth's surface, hence the term "geosynchronous."
The geosynchronous orbit actually has "a dual 'orbit/spectrum'
nature because its value can only be realized through the simultaneous
exploitation of both the geostationary orbit and the electromagnetic
bands. 16 7 Since it is one of "the world's most important reservoirs of
value," ' 6 it has quite naturally been subject to competing claims. While
most of the world recognizes the geosynchronous orbit to be subject to
the OST (i.e., it can be used by anyone, but appropriated by no one),
many equatorial States claim the geosynchronous orbit as their sovereign
resource by virtue of their equatorial location. 9 Fearing that the geos-
tationary orbit would be completely occupied before their governments
could enjoy any direct benefits, several equatorial States asserted their
claims to the geostationary orbit above their respective countries in the
Bogota Declaration in December of 1976. These States based their claim
on the scientifically erroneous 70 notion that "the existence of the orbit
depended exclusively on its relation to the gravitational phenomena
generated by the Earth." ' 71 (Achieving a geostationary orbit is actually
dependent on the velocity and position of the satellite as well as grav-
itational attraction which is, of course, created by the total mass of the
object being orbited.) Hence, the infirmities of the scientific basis of
the Bogota Declaration and the fact that the geostationary orbit is located
too far out in space (22,300 miles) to be realistically considered connected
with equatorial states has robbed the Declaration of any validity.7 2 These
facts and the likelihood that the Bogota Declaration was made too late
to preempt a rule of customary international law permitting free access
and use of the geosynchronous orbit73 strongly indicate that the Dec-
laration places no restriction on DBS.
67. Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation, 76 Am. J. Int'l.
L. 56, 56 (1982).
68. Id. at 56.
69. Bogota Declaration, Dec. 3, 1976 reprinted in C. Christol, supra note 1, at 891.
70. C. Christol, supra note 1, at 455.
71. Id. at 455.
72. Gorove, supra note 25, at 326.
73. The first atellite to achieve geosynchronous orbit was the United States satellite
Syncom 2 in 1963. Thus, the equatorial States waited over 13 years to assert their claim,
a strong indication of acquiescence on their part.
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Positions of States at the UN on the Free Flow of Information
A second point of contention regarding DBS which is not so easily
dispatched is the concept of the free flow of information across national
borders. Universal acceptance of this concept would virtually eliminate
opposition to direct television broadcasting without prior consent; how-
ever, nothing close to general acceptance of this idea exists or is likely
to exist in the near future. The subject of freedom of information and
the right to communicate has been so hotly debated that when the
International Institute of Communications of London met in Cologne
in 1975, its efforts were directed merely at a description of the right
to communicate rather than a legal definition.7 4 Although other inter-
national studies have been made and have concluded that the jus com-
municationis and the right to information are fundamental rights essential
to contemporary human society,75 the continuing controversy in the U.N.
has shown that these concepts are far from attaining world-wide ac-
ceptance 76
Fear of television broadcasts without prior consent was raised in
U.N. resolution 1962 (XVIII) as early as 1963." 7 The U.N. has since
provided three major avenues for negotiation of this issue: (1) the ITU,
(2) UNESCO, and (3) the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space. 7 The present status of DBS with regard to the ITU is that the
technical regulations for DBS make direct broadcast very difficult and
have sharply reduced the possibility of intentional spillover of signals. 79
It should be reiterated that since ITU regulations are not treaties, the States
which fear direct broadcasting are still strongly advocating a treaty which
would prevent direct broadcasting without prior consent of the target State. 0
As the result of several years of debate, UNESCO issued a decla-
ration on the use of satellite broadcasting to increase the free flow of
information in 1972.81 Despite speaking only in terms of "prior agree-
ments," the substance of the declaration embodied the prior consent
principle 2 and passed on a vote of 55 in favor, 7 against, and 22
abstentions. 3 However, since the declaration does not have the binding
74. Williams, Teleinformatics, the Protection of Privacy and the Law, 7 Annals Air
& Space L. 447, 448 (1982).
75. Id. at 449.
76. Id. at 450.
77. G.A. 1962 (XVIII), reprinted in 1963 U.N.Y.B. 101.
78. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 198.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 85-97.
81. Rice, supra note 37, at 820.
82. Id.
83. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 133.
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effect of a treaty,8 4 and since a large number of States failed to assent
to it, the legal significance of the declaration is questionable.
The major work at the U.N. was accomplished by the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which as the only inter-
national, intergovernmental body exclusively concerned with outer space,
occupies a strong position in the network of organizations which handle
outer space matters.8" In COPUOS debates on DBS, a polarization
developed with some States arguing for no control whatsoever while
others argued for strict regulation (i.e., prior consent).8 6
Three factors motivated those against regulation:
(1) Technical and economic considerations were not favorable
to the appearance of the direct broadcast satellite in the near
future; (2) Imposing regulations on a technology which had not
even appeared and about which little was actually known might
hamper its development; (3) The free flow of information and
ideas across the world . . . [should not] be obstructed ...
[because] the "right to give and impart information," as rec-
ognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, meant
that at least as much importance should be given to the free
flow of information as to the respect for national sovereignty.17
Three factors also motivated those urging regulation: "(1) the need for
domestic control and approval of program content; (2) the belief that
operational systems were imminent; and (3) the realization that only a
few States were technically and financially able to implement such a
satellite."8
The specific positions of individual States, or groups of States, are
noteworthy in order to gauge the firmness of their positions. The Soviet
Union favors strict control of DBS and is followed by many under-
developed countries19-but for different reasons. While the Soviet Union's
main fear is of Western propaganda, the underdeveloped countries fear
loss of cultural identity and loss of political control over their own
populations. 90 This fear of loss of cultural identity has been strongly
expressed by many nations (not all underdeveloped), with some States
limiting or even denying access by their populations to the currently
existing television services of certain super-powers. 9' Aside from the
84. Rice, supra note 37, at 820.
85. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 18.
86. Id. at 79-80.
87. Id. at 37.
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id. at 79.
90. Id. at 48.
91. Comment, supra note 7, at 75.
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possibility of mind control and cross-cultural shock, 92 DBS could actually
result in a loss of a sense of political separateness, since the heads of
State of the superpowers could address the population of an underde-
veloped country while that State's own leader could not. 93
The United States' position, supported only by the United Kingdom
and, to a limited extent, Japan and Belgium, advocates complete freedom
of the flow of ideas and information without any regulation, based on
the notion that these concepts are so fundamental to individuals that
no restrictions could be tolerated.
94
A middle ground has been established by Canada and Sweden who
advocate the establishment of a broad framework of principles, sup-
plemented by specific regional agreements, rather than a global treaty
applicable'to all. 95
While some agreements have been reached, there has been little prog-
ress in resolving the question of prior consent. In fact, in 1981 the
COPUOS Working Group submitted a report on DBS, but the text of
the Draft Principles presented by the Group contained so many square
brackets (indicating a lack of agreement) that a "consensus regarding
the vital issues is certainly not in sight." ' 96 In 1982 negotiations came
to a "complete standstill." 97
Summary
Free access and use of the geosynchronous orbit resource, though
disputed, has been accepted by the vast majority of States and appears
to be customary international law. However, specific uses of DBS have
not proved susceptible of international agreement. And while the ITU
has managed to reduce the fears of many States by setting technical
regulations which make direct broadcasting to unaugmented receivers
very difficult, 98 UNESCO's efforts to draft an acceptible resolution have
failed, 99 as have similar efforts by COPUOS.' °° Thus, the future de-
velopment of international law applicable to DBS seems likely to be
restricted to customary international law and not international agree-
ments.
92. K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 49.
93. Id. at 49.
94. Id. at 79.
95. Id. at 80.
96. Teleinformatics, supra note 74, at 450.
97. Id. at 450.
98. See supra note 54.
99. C. Christol, supra note 1, at 613.
100. Logsdon, Direct Broadcast Satellites: International Policy Issues, in Space Activ-
ities, supra note 45, at 43, 47.
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Is There Any Customary International Law of Outer Space?
Current International Law and the Placement of DBS in Space
"Influence on the development of economically rewarding ap-
plications of space technology such as DBS ... may have passed
the UN by, with delegates from the space capable states in
COPUOS conducting a delaying action until application systems
are in place and operating [,then international legal principles
may be fitted to economic realities.]"' 0'1
Given the current state of affairs, the preceding passage also appears
applicable to the other international efforts to agree on DBS. In fact,
since slightly over half of the nations of the world have ratified the
Outer Space Treaty "and successively less have ratified or acceded to
the other United Nations agreements and conventions,"''0 2 it can be said
that there is no widely accepted, codified law of space applicable to all
countries.' 3 In fact, the International Court of Justice has stated that
a limited number of states ratifying a treaty is evidence that the treaty
in question did not codify international custom. 0 4 However, the lack
of generally agreed upon codification does not mean that there is no
international law of outer space applicable to all countries, for customary
international law of outer space exists apart from the treaties.' 5 Indeed,
the process of the development of international law for outer space
activities is "precisely the same as is maintained for [the] . . .earth,
including ocean and air space, activities"'' 0 6 (i.e., through "explicit agree-
ment and the implicit communications of customary behavior [, with]
. . . implicit communications . . . [playing] a much more important
role than agreement or other deliberate formulation" 0 7).
Since explicit agreement efforts arguably have failed to produce an
adequate, reliable body of international space law, implicit communi-
cations of customary behavior must be examined. In doing so, it appears
that the existence per se of DBS has been sanctioned by State practice,
since over 100 Western nations currently avail themselves of INTELSAT 08
101. Id. at 49.
102. Dula, supra note 35, at 38.
103. Id. at 32. It should also be noted that no generally accepted principles exist for
copyright protection, the rights of neighboring countries, or the protection of broadcasts.
K. Queeney, supra note 4, at 52.
104. Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru) 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277.
105. McDougal, supra note 66, at 618.
106. Id. at 623.
107. Id. at 625.
108. Canby, supra note 10, at 290.
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(an international network of DBS) and the Soviet bloc uses
INTERSPUTNIK109 for parallel purposes. Additional weight in favor of
international acceptance of the legality of DBS is found in the lack of
objection by States to the use of space for DBS providing purely domestic
service to a State.110
Terrestrial Precedent for the Use of DBS Without Prior Consent of
the Target State
Once the placement of DBS in outer space is found acceptable in
international law, the question of what uses of DBS are permissible
logically arises. As mentioned earlier,"' the unrestricted broadcast of
propaganda and information is the major concern in this area. Using
terrestrial precedent as a means of determining the legality of direct
television broadcast of information and/or propaganda is difficult be-
cause the issue is extraordinarily complex and, to a certain degree, the
accepted legal principles are in direct conflict. This confusing state of
affairs results from the inherent conflict between the sovereign rights
of cultural independence and self-determination, and the concept of
freedom of information which springs from the amorphous concept of
Human Rights. The use of terrestrial precedent is further complicated
by the fact that, on Earth, only radio has been used to broadcast
propaganda and news information because of the limited range of earth-
based television signals. As a result, it may be illogical to expect the
international rules which developed around radio broadcasts to be ap-
plicable to the psychologically more powerful television broadcasts. 1 2
Nevertheless, assuming the applicability of terrestrial precedent, the in-
ternational legal status of propaganda may provide a basis for deter-
mining the legality of information broadcasts.
While state practice and explicit declarations of positions have sanc-
tioned certain uses of propaganda," 3 some forms of propaganda are
prohibited by customary international law."14 Unfortunately, categorizing
109. Parry, Spaced Out-Satellite Remote Sensing-The Costs and Benefits, in Space
Activities supra note 45, at 68, 95.
110. While the equatorial states object over the issue of uncompensated access to the
geostationary orbit, none has expressed an objection to the placement of DBS in geo-
synchronous orbit if the orbit resource is resolved in their favor.
Ill. See supra text accompanying notes 76-97.
112. See supra text accompanying note 92.
113. Whitton, Hostile International Propaganda and International Law, in National
Sovereignty and International Communication 217 (1979) [hereinafter cited as International
Communication].
114. Id. at 221.
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such broadcasts is exceedingly difficult. For example, the Soviet Union
favors rules against war propaganda, but not if the conflict in question
is one of "liberation" or "anti-colonialism.""' Despite the difficulty in
defining or recognizing propaganda, the illegality of subversive propa-
ganda is borne out by several sources. In addition to the arguments
that subversive propaganda violates the fundamental principle of the
right of a State to exist, abrogates the right of a State to be free from
foreign coercion, and constitutes internationally prohibited aggression," 6
it must be noted that although nations accused of using such propaganda
deny their guilt, no country has denied the existence of the prohibition
against such broadcasts." 7 Defamatory propaganda directed against a
State or its rulers is also considered illegal," 8 and war propaganda is,
or is quickly becoming, internationally prohibited." 9 The possibility of
privately instigated propaganda should not pose a great problem, since
most States would be able to control private individuals so that the
State itself would not incur liability for their actions. 20 The Constitution's
mandate of free speech probably would not prevent government control
in this area, since the rationale of national security would likely override
the First Amendment.' 2'
Nevertheless, the problem of loss of cultural integrity due to direct
television broadcasts is a difficult one to solve even without the problems
posed by propaganda. For example, while Article I of UNESCO's unan-
imously adopted Declaration of the Principles of International Coop-
eration states that "each culture has a dignity and value which must
be respected and preserved . . . [and] every people has the right . . .
to develop its culture,""'2 Article IV states that "the aims of international
115. Id. at 217.
116. Id. at 220.
117. Id. at 221.
118. Id. at 222.
119. Id. at 224-26; see also U.N. Resolution 110(01), Yearbook 1947-1948, at 91-93.
120. Whitton, supra note 113, at 228.
121. An extended analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but gov-
ernment restriction of speech contrary to national security has been sanctioned by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, .39 S. Ct. 247 (1919);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 40 S. Ct. 17 (1919); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 71 S. Ct. 857 (1951). See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
65 S. Ct. 193 (1944) in which the racially discriminatory internment of American citizens
of Japanese descent was allowed on the grounds of national security. Evidently, then, if
privately instigated propaganda broadcasts posed a sufficient threat to national security,
the Supreme Court would sanction government restriction of such broadcasts.
122. UNESCO, Declaration of Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, art.
I, Nov. 4, 1966, as quoted in Eek, Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media as
Defined by the United Nations and UNESCO, in International Communication, supra
note 113. at 173, 191.
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cultural cooperation . . .shall be to spread knowledge . . . [and] enable
everyone to have access to knowledge." 23 The tension between the goals
of preserving cultural indentity and the goal of spreading knowledge to
"everyone" is obvious. While one might argue that such statements
merely stand for the notion of the free flow of information between
governments who would then be responsible for disseminating it to their
people, the counter-argument is that this interpretation would actually
inhibit the free flow of information and therefore run contrary to the
UNESCO Declaration. Thus, even if virtually all forms of propaganda
are considered prohibited, the broadcast of carefully selected, though
factually accurate, news items could have exactly the same negative
effect on the receiving States. In fact, the U.S. position is that factually
accurate news broadcasts are even more politically effective than prop-
aganda.
Not even the firmly established principle of national sovereignty ad-
equately relieves the tension between freedom of information and pres-
ervation of cultural integrity because matters which were previously
thought to be of purely domestic concern have become the subjects of
increasingly greater international concern; for example, the protection
of basic human rights irrespective of national borders has become cus-
tomary international law. 24 In light of what has been said throughout
this Comment, the process of "internationalization" of certain formerly
domestic issues seems to have already occurred with regard to the free
flow of information, though the issue is far from being settled.
One interesting and internationally legal method available for States
wishing to prevent foreign broadcasts from entering their country is to
claim economic protection for that State's own developing television
industry. 125 Since States currently engage in economic protectionism for
other fledgling industries, this justification would also seem to be legally
viable for seeking to halt foreign broadcasts which constitute unfair
competition with domestic stations. Of course, in bringing such a claim
to an international body, the target State would bear a significant burden
of proof which in most cases would probably be far more difficult to
sustain than in the typical case of industrial protection, since the target
State would have to prove it was sincerely attempting to start a television
industry.
123. Id. at art. IV.
124. Gross, Some International Law Aspects of the Freedom of Information and the
Right to Communicate, in International Communication, supra note 113, at 195.
125. De Sola Pool, Direct Broadcast Satellites and the Integrity of National Culture,
in International Communications, supra note 113, at 120, 152.
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Summary
Though the placement of DBS in orbit is sanctioned by State practice,
the uses of DBS once in orbit are not, and determining the legal status
of those uses is extremely difficult because so few States are financially
capable of beginning direct television broadcasts to unaugmented home
television sets. With so few States involved for such a short period of
time, and the major participants in direct opposition on the issue, 26 a
determination of an established, positive rule of customary international
law is impossible, and quite probably inappropriate, 2 7 particularly since
the international law of space is developing in the absence of previously
existing international law.
Furthermore, terrestrial precedents of radio broadcasting of news or
propaganda are of little help (even if one ignores the conceptual problem
of comparing psychologically more powerful television programs to radio
programs) because of the inherent difficulty in deciding both what
constitutes propaganda and whether the free flow of information from
a news broadcast is culturally destructive. Thus, even if we can apply
terrestrial prohibitions against certain types of propaganda, success in
defining these prohibitions will continue to be elusive. As far as pre-
serving a State's cultural identity is concerned, it must be recognized
as a fact of modern international life that every State experiences some
loss of cultural indentity with every contact it makes with another State,
and deciding what broadcasts constitute a threat to a State's cultural
integrity would be even more difficult than determining what constitutes
propaganda. Given the nebulous state of international law with regard
to the uses of DBS, the law of outer space appears increasingly likely
to evolve slowly, with legal principles developing out of implicit com-
munications of customary behavior rather than explicit agreements on
what the law is.
The Immediate Future of Direct Broadcast Satellites
In 1979 the World Administrative Radio Conference recommended
to the ITU Administrative Council that a conference should be convened
entitled "World Administrative Radio Conference on the Use of the
Geostationary Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing
It." Currently, two WARC conferences are scheduled to discuss this
topic, one in July of 1985 and the other in September of 1987.128 The
history of international debate on the subject of DBS, as this Comment
has recounted, does not present an optimistic picture for these confer-
ences. As one author aptly described the situation, "it is rare that men
126. For discussion on the U.S./U.S.S.R. polarization see supra text accompanying
notes 89-94.
127. North Sea Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 43.
128. Christol, National Claims for the Using/Sharing of the Orbit/Spectrum Resource,
in American Inst. of Aeronautics & Astronony, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Collo-
quium on the Law of Outer Space 295, 297 (1983).
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have been able in advance to agree on the rules which should govern
any new and important innovation, and there is little evidence in the
historical record to think that the situation will be any different for
DBS." 129
In addition to the dim future of negotiations, recent studies indicate
that some basic assumptions regarding DBS have been undercut by
technological advance. The expected problem of crowding in the geos-
tationary orbit, possibly to the exclusion of late-developing States, has
been alleviated to a great degree by the prospect of spacing the satellites
closer together, albeit at an increased cost to ground stations. 30 Further,
constant technological development indicates that the frequency spectrum
is not as limited as was once thought.' 3 ' "Thus, the outlook appears
to be gaining ground that, through the efficient and economical use of
both high and low frequencies, the needs of both the advanced States
and the [less developed countries] . . . can be satisfied.'1 2 In fact, it
has been argued that resource engineering, which is more efficient than
resource planning, would not only solve most of the problems raised
by underdeveloped countries with regard to the economic benefit of
DBS, but that taking advantage of new, more efficient technology for
such engineering is mandated by international law.' Thus, it appears
that continuous technological developments will continue to complicate
outer space activities far faster than negotiations can address the issues
raised.
Additionally, economic developments will continue to complicate
matters. For example, the economic attractiveness of severing satellite
ownership is increasing, and "[als satellite ownership becomes increas-
ingly fragmented, it [will become] correspondingly difficult to associate
particular treaty and statutory obligations (e.g., coordination, tariffs, and
permissible business practices) with specific entities."' 34 In other words,
these developments indicate that space is becoming more and more like
Earth.
Contrary to what one would expect, this is bad for international
negotiations and makes international agreement less likely because, unlike
terrestrial situations, the regulation of space is not subject to any single,
all-encompassing authority the way terrestrial developments are always
subject to absolute regulation by central governments. In all likelihood,
129. Logsdon, supra note 100, at 47.
130. Vicas, An Economic Assessment of CCIR's Five Methods for Assuring Guaranteed
Access to the Orbit-Spectrum Resource, 7 Annals Air & Space L. 431, 435-36 (1982) (The
closer satellite spacing requires that different frequency bands be allocated to adjacent
satellites or that surface receiving dishes be larger.).
131. Christol, supra note 128, at 298.
132. Id. at 298.
133. Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation, 76 Am. J. Int'l L.
56, 73 (1982).
134. Smith & Rothblatt, Geostationary Platforms: Legal Estates in Space, 10 J. Space
L. 31, 35 (1982).
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the more space takes on the characteristics of Earth, the more likely
negotiations regarding space will resemble the ultimately unsuccessful
efforts to work out a comprehensive means of regulating the world's
oceans: too many complex issues and too many special domestic interests
of the States involved to allow creation of a negotiated regime.
Conclusion
The major fear raised by direct television broadcasts without prior
consent is the loss of cultural integrity. However, loss of cultural integrity
is a natural result of the interaction of nations and is occurring at a
greater rate every day. Thus, in a world of nations which are increasingly
accessible to more people and are increasingly intertwined in countless
ways, the problem presented by direct television broadcasts is better
stated as the possibility of rapid loss of cultural identity. Since deciding
when such violations of cultural integrity occur or deciding what con-
stitutes a violation will almost certainly prove impossible, perhaps the
only method to prevent cultural shock is to prohibit absolutely any
direct television broadcast without prior consent.
However, since existing treaties do not offer a basis for this pro-
hibition, and the prospects of a future agreement on this principle are
exceedingly remote, the only remaining source for developing of such
a principle of international law is that of implicit communication by
behavior. Since such a large number of States oppose such a ban,'35
development of a prohibition against direct television broadcasts without
prior consent of the receiving State is unlikely to arise from this source
either.
Yet, while direct television broadcasts would not violate international
law, those States fearing cultural destruction may already have the
protection they require in the ITU technical regulations which make
such broadcasts so difficult. Since the real fear of these States is rapid
infusion of foreign ideas into their cultures, the ITU regulations should
be sufficient to prevent this. Of course, the technical regulations could
be changed, and technological advances could permit direct broadcasts
despite current regulations. In that event, without a treaty, little legal
protection would remain.
Considering the complexity of the issues involved, the extreme ide-
ological and technological differences between the nations of the world,
and the poor history of laws which have attempted a priori regulation
of rapidly advancing social and technological developments, the possi-
bility of international consensus on direct broadcast satellites will likely
remain light years away.
James Edwin Bailey, III
135. It is important to reemphasize that although Canada and Sweden favor some
controls, they are not in favor of a complete prohibition on the use of DBS.
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